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As the Army Reserve focuses on meeting the demands of an operational reserve, it cannot neglect its obligation to sustain its defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) capabilities for the Department of Defense (DOD). The Defense Science Board Task Force conducted a study which questioned the "availability of National Guard and reserve personnel and equipment to meet homeland security, civil support, and domestic emergency requirements along with robust overseas deployments." 2 The transition from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve force is stifled by reality. The Defense Science Board Task Force did not find any enabling steps by the Army to facilitate this transition. Accordingly, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that the military must ensure it "preserves a significant 'strategic reserve' capability and capacity." 3 These words of caution imply that traditional mission requirements for the reserve components will continue in this transformational environment.
The Army Reserve can meet its obligation for homeland security through the foreseeable future, but must guard against creating capability shortfalls during transformation. This paper will address the breadth of changes in the Army Reserve which may lead to an inability to meet homeland security obligations; identify some of its specified and implied tasks in the civil support domain; and define challenges to providing civil support. This paper provides recommendations that will help the Army
Reserve guard against potential capability shortfalls and overcome some challenges to its ability to fulfill its specified and implied obligations when the nation calls.
As the Army Reserve undergoes change, it must guard against any potential and inherent capability and performance shortages. As a consequence of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Army Reserve is sustaining a historically high level of mobilization and deployment of units and personnel. To meet the demands of the ARFORGEN model, the Army Reserve has developed a five-year process ( Figure 1 below) which moves units through three defined phases: (1) reset and train; reconstituting units as they recover from recent deployments or constitute due to reorganization or activation, (2) Reserve to meet growing expectations in an already resource constrained operating environment.
Challenges to Providing Civil Support
Many challenges confront the Army Reserve while attempting to sustain and improve its ability to provide defense support to civil authorities during a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Some of the challenges include legal restraints, administrative requirements, transformation from a strategic force to an operational force, and structure changes. Several of these challenges inter-relate and are stifling under the current laws, policies and directives.
The first challenge is to sustain strong relationships with FEMA regions as the temporary tour of active duty (TTAD), or even AT). 8 The term reserve active duty will include ADT, TTAD, active duty for special works (ADSW) and AT for the remainder of this paper. 
Readiness of redeployed forces and new organizations is a fourth challenge.
Personnel and equipment readiness are the primary challenges for the first year after redeployment or reorganization. Many units that return from OEF, OIF or other deployments lose over fifty percent of their personnel strength as a result of losing (1) cross-leveled Soldiers, (2) those reaching the end of their service obligations, (3) those remaining on active duty, (4) those relocating to another area, and (5) those retiring.
New organizations systematically report themselves as non-deployable for a prescribed time period as they work to achieve an acceptable readiness level. Reorganized or newly activated units may also have training challenges. Both redeployed units and new organizations are capable of fulfilling DSCA mission assignments prior to achieving deployable status on the USR or any other combat readiness evaluation. USARC posits that any unit, regardless of its deployment status, can provide immediate response for RFAs. When sourcing for special capabilities, USARC will consider units in year four and five for mission assignments.
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New units are susceptible to mission assignments prior to achieving full operational capability and may alleviate the fifth challenge to some degree.
Reserve Center Coverage The fifth and final challenge is providing a time sensitive response to remote locations. The effectiveness of staging and deploying DOD response capabilities is dependent on unit location and installations available to support the alert, deployment and employment of units. As BRAC changes reduce the number of reserve centers across the country and re-position them in highly populated areas, the Army Reserve must assess and mitigate any potential reduction in its ability to support incidents in rural or less populated areas. The distance from an incident negatively affects how quickly a unit can respond. In this case, early alert and pre-positioning of units becomes essential to successfully providing a time sensitive response to civil authorities. Figure 2 displays the areas that have reserve units within a 50-mile radius (white circles). The areas covered will reduce more over the next two years as a result of BRAC implementation.
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